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While current neoliberal privatisation laws provide for protections to indigenous lands, no formal or informal
mechanisms exist for natives to actually enjoy such safeguards.
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European colonial projects depended on the racialisation of native populations to maintain their economies of
plunder. The belief that indigenous peoples were inherently unable to enjoy the same rights as colonists undergirded
colonial civil society and legitimised, in contemporary eyes, brutal exploitation and even genocide. Europeans from
Juan de Matienzo in the sixteenth century to Mario Vargas Llosa more recently have furthermore argued that these
costs were worth paying, as European colonialism brought with it enlightened civilisation. The ends, they have said,
justified the means.
Troubling echoes of this mentality are still apparent today, namely in the Peruvian government’s approach to
indigenous land rights. The current neoliberal project centres on the concept of market rule: governments must alter
all goods and services so they can be traded in the global marketplace. In highland Peru, new laws enabled the
marketisation of indigenous lands, explicitly promoting dispossession as the most efficient outcome and therein
improving the wellbeing of all. “This model of smallholders without technology is a vicious circle of extreme poverty”,
explained Peru’s president Alan García in 2007. “We must encourage mediumsized property, the middle class of
farmers who know how to obtain resources, seek out markets and create formal jobs”.
Nevertheless, Peru’s recent law on land ownership, passed in 1995, paternalistically provides rights specifically for
natives, the majority of smallholders, out of respect for traditions going back to “ancient times”. Only seventeen
percent of all landholdings in Peru have clear title, with the number much lower in the Andes. In order to rectify this,
the new legislation allows that “under current law, the titling of the communities can take two modalities: communal or
individual”. That is, the law provides for clear private titles as well as for titles based on the indigenousassociated
community system, which is protected against taxation and appropriation in order to enable the poor to keep their

lands as the basis of their survival. The law further holds that the lands of indigenous communities can only become
private if a majority of the villagers vote in favour of privatisation (at the time of passage the proportion needed was
set at twothirds).

Rights on paper only
I conducted a multiyear ethnographic study in the village of Huaytabamba (all names are pseudonyms) from 1999 to
2003, where a fierce battle over privatising the lands had broken out. Located twelve twisty kilometres above the
regional capital of Ayacucho in south central Peru, villagers in this Quechuaspeaking community survive on less
than a dollar a day. The food they eat primarily comes from their own fields. Only four families wished to privatise
lands, whereas more than 30 adamantly opposed it for fear of once again becoming beholden to a draconian landed
elite.
One man, Pedro, led the charge against privatisation by attempting to exercise his rights as given by the new law.
However, Pedro not only discovered that the infrastructure needed for him to enjoy his rights did not exist, but also
that an array of forces was actively undermining his attempts to do so. In other words, Pedro found neoliberalism
reproducing colonial forms of racial domination that confined him to rightless status and allowed for the seizure of his
lands.
First, the government’s ‘special land titling project’ (PETT in its Spanish acronym), which was charged with
implementing the law, did not provide for the communitybased option. It only supplied private titles. This was in part
because PETT personnel viewed private titles as the superior option. They described these in interviews as simple
resources for improving wellbeing, as they provided access to cash through loans and sales, something community
held titles did not do. They therefore saw the desire to keep the land communal as irrational.
Pedro and his allies thus turned to the second protection mechanism included in the law: the need for a majority
vote. In stark contrast to national elections, which are strictly regulated so as to minimise manipulation by the
powerful, PETT provided neither resources nor guidance to local communities in order to ensure the fidelity of the
vote. The villagers were simply left to their own devices. Pedro saw his chance when it became his turn to act as
president of the community, and he brought the issue to a vote in the village assembly. Villagers soundly defeated
the issue, with over 90 percent voting against privatisation. The village elite responded with blatant disregard, and
despite the fact that the vote was held in accordance with the new law they persisted in their attempts at
privatisation.
Pedro and his backers attempted further votes that would more concretely solidify the popular will as the law of the
village. They exacted commitments from all major regional authorities to come regulate the decision making process,
including the mayor, the district governor, and a judge. Against this threat, the village privatisers launched a vicious
campaign condemning such actions as external manipulation that undermined village sovereignty. That this
sovereignty was based on the community government, the specific entity the privatisers sought to eliminate, was
immaterial.
The actions against the district mayor were particularly vicious. The privatisers denounced the mayor, including
through the Quechua language radio station, for building a school that had never seen a student because it had
immediately flooded. They accused him of undertaking the project only to win votes. As one worker put it, “the mayor
got them all to vote for him and now this school is flooded.” The privatisers condemned the mayor, saying, “this is not
a school; this is only a corral; you who have been a teacher and now are mayor should fix it.” While the school
construction was clearly corrupt, what the privatisers conveniently overlooked was that the project was brokered
locally by one of their own.
The mayor, like the other officials, did not expect such brazen hostility. They assumed their roles would be more
formal and based on their authority. Thus, when they were blindsided, they quickly pulled back from their promises.
On the day Pedro had scheduled external authorities to come help, he and I scoured the provincial capital to get

them to make good on their promises. But we only found locked doors. These urban authorities had no institutional
or legal obligation to fulfil a regulatory role, and they gladly fell back on this lest the accusations of manipulation stick
on them and ruin their careers. Thus, in simply doing their job, these officials helped preserve the system in which
the indigenous do not enjoy substantive rights.

False friends
Pedro’s urban allies provided the greatest betrayal. The community faction secured village presentations from three
different organisations, believing that a village vote would immediately follow based on the information provided. For
instance, when Pedro and I visited the defensoría del pueblo, the government sponsored human rights ombudsman,
the young lawyer working there explained the law in easy terms and said he would have no problem making a
presentation to the village. An Ayacucho nongovernmental organisation and the secretary general of the Peruvian
Peasant Confederation (CCP) made similar presentations. All these organisations agreed with the majority that
privatisation was against its best interests.
But these organisations—the community’s greatest urban allies—refused to help regularise the voting process. They
demurred not because of threats from the privatisers, but rather because they saw facilitating an intimidationfree
vote as interfering with local selfdetermination. So they declined offers to help regulate a vote because they thought
they were respecting village autonomy, not helping to undermine it.
Such behaviour denied the manipulative informality dominating political processes in Huaytabamba. It instead
presupposed the existence of local mechanisms to guarantee a free and open vote, even though these organisations
were aware that the privatisers fearlessly employed intimidation and fraud to get their way. While these organisations
did not want to give the impression of manipulating the process, they did nothing to moderate the rampant coercion
and therefore countenanced it through inaction. In this way, foes, friends, and all levels of government worked
together to undermine the desires and rights of the indigenous villagers, and thus to give them a push down the path
to dispossession.

